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The origins of national education systems have constituted one of the chief
preoccupations of educational historiography during the last twenty years and,
latterly, state formation has offered one of the major explanatory paradigms.
Versions of this approach have been developed in a number of studies of
educational development in Australia, Canada, Sweden, Prussia, Britain, and
elsewhere (Miller, 1986; Curtis, 1988; Melton, 1988; Boh, 1989; Green, 1990;
Davey and Miller, 1990). Most of these originated in research begun in the early
and mid-1980s, some ten years ago. The 1993 conference plenary of the Austra
lian, New Zealand, and Canadian History of Education Societies thus offered an
appropriate time and place to re-assess current directions of research in this field.
The Search for a New Problematic
One way to start such a review is to ask why a number of historians of
education should have embarked upon similar avenues of research at about the
same time. What prompted a range of historians, in, for the most part, different
locations and often with somewhat different intellectual formations, simultane
ously to start asking a new set of questions about the origins of mass education?
I would like to suggest that there were at least two common interests which
broadly lay behind these new developments. The first of these was a common
desire to understand better the complexity of power relations obtaining between
the state and its subjects/citizens, between social classes, and between men and
women, and the implications of this for the formation of mass education systems.
The second, and related, concern was the desire to explain the uneven historical
development of national education systems in different countries, including those
pioneering systems which emerged first under the eighteenth-century absolutist
states.
In a sense the 'state formation' problematic (or the 'educational state' as
Curtis calls it) can be seen as a second wave of historical revisionism which
follows on from (and reacts to) the work of the American 'Revisionist' school in
the 1960s and 1970s, and most particularly that of Michael Katz, its pre-eminent
exponent. Taking their lead from Bernard Bailyn's path-breaking Education in
the Forming of American Society (1960), and no doubt influenced by the contem
porary educational catastrophism of Kozol and others, U.S. educational historians
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of this period sought to debunk the rather historicist, Whiggish accounts of
nineteenth-century education as the triumph of democratic idealism and to replace
them with a narrative which recognized the class nature of the ideals pursued by
the early pioneers of state education. Their critique was widely accepted and
there is little need to remind ourselves of the vitality and power of the work
produced by Katz, Bowles and Gintis, and others during this period.
However, the work on the educational state dates from a later period, by
which time historians were preoccupied with new concerns and aware of the
limitations of the early revisionist paradigm. By 1976, Katz (1976) had already
declared his uneasiness with a 'social control' theory which presented state
education as a one-way imposition from above on reluctant urban working-class
populations. Both he and Bowles and Gintis, in a later self-critique, were now
looking for a more mediated or dialectical way of construing the complex and
reciprocal nature of power relations, and like many historians were increasingly
attracted to Gramscian notions of hegemony as a means to do this. Much of the
recent work under discussion takes off, I believe, from this point, driven by a
desire to find more complex and nuanced ways of understanding the power
relations involved in schooling. Bruce Curtis has used Foucauldian discourse
theory to analyze the dispersal of power within the Canadian educational state;
Ian Davey and Pavla Miller have used theories of patriarchy and family formation
to understand a crucial aspect of state—and educational-state—formation; and I
have worked primarily with Gramscian notions of hegemony to explain the
differing relations between the state and schooling in different societies.
The second factor which encouraged the development of new theoretical
approaches was the need to explain the uneven historical development of national
education systems. In her major comparative work, The Social Origins of
Education Systems (1979), Margaret Archer had clearly pointed out how inade
quate were existing theories of educational change for explaining the differential
timing and form of educational development across a range of countries. Theo
ries which linked the rise of national education systems with industrialization and
urbanization, in particular, faced considerable difficulties in explaining why it
was that the first national systems emerged in pre-industrial and largely rural
societies, like Prussia, Austria, and France, whilst in other countries, like England,
such developments largely post-dated industrial take-off and widespread urbani
zation. Clearly a new approach was needed. Margaret Archer's own solution
was to focus the question on the process of institutional change, putting the
interaction of educational interest groups at centre stage. This certainly brought
back into the historical equation the state dimension which David Tyack (1986)
was later to argue had been overly neglected by the revisionists. What it did not
do was provide any kind of theory of the state.
The work on education and state formation thus arose partly as a way of
dealing with these two sets of problems. However, it was also driven and
facilitated by two other contemporary factors. The role of the state in education,
and indeed in all other areas of life, had been increasingly problematized since
the late 1970s by the rise of the new right with its neo-liberal philosophy of
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'rolling back the frontiers of the state,' as it was once described by Margaret
Thatcher. The growing ascendancy during the 1980s, at least in the English-
speaking world, of a new free-market education ideology, naturally challenged
historians to reconsider the role of the state in education in former times, and for
those of us not convinced of the viability of a free market in education, to question
carefully the claims of neo-liberal historians, like West, about the advantages of
laissez-faire policies in nineteenth-century England. Indefensibly 'presentist' as
this motivation may seem to some historical purists, there can be no denying that
it has been a powerful motivating factor.
If this was the agenda, what made it possible in the 1980s to look for new
ways of explaining educational change were the new analytical tools provided by
Foucauldian discourse theory and state formation theory, both of which were
indebted, in their different ways, to the revival of Gramsci and his seminal
writings on the educational role of the state. A key moment in this regard was
clearly the publication in 1985 of Corrigan and Sayer's book, The Great Arch:
English State Formation as Cultural Revolution, which can be seen, in a sense,
as a history of the various ways in which one national state throughout the ages
has educated its subjects into their national class and gender roles.
The Critique of Older Paradigms
Before moving on to discuss the 'state formation' problematic itself, it may
be worth dwelling for a moment on some of the other classic versions of
educational development that preceded it and upon which it seeks to improve.
The three most important of these are: 1) Whig or liberal theory; 2) structural
functionalism; and 3) neo-Marxist theories of urbanization and proletarianization.
Where does the state formation argument leave these other explanations of the
origins of mass schooling?
1) Whig Theory
The Whig account of educational development in the nineteenth century has
been under sustained attack from educational historians since the 1960s on a
number of counts. The American 'revisionists' (Katz, 1976) criticized the
histories of Elwood Cubberley and his ilk for the allegedly historicist and
mythological character of their narratives of educational progress as triumphant
humanitarian idealism; Davey and Miller (1990) have shown how gender-blind
are the notions of 'rights' and 'democracy' employed in such accounts; and others
(Green, 1990; Melton, 1988) have argued the inadequacy of such models for
explaining educational development in continental Europe. Post-modernists
generally have been unremittingly hostile to all meta-narratives, particularly
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those stemming from the eighteenth-century western European Enlightenment,
and for a post-modern educational historiography, Whig narratives of educational
progress would, no doubt, be complete anathema. My own view is that the
'Whig' version is inadequate, though not because it is historicist, since all
historiography starts from the present; not because it represents a 'meta-narra-
tive,' since historians must explain and interpret; and not even because it talks of
'progress,' since I share the view that educational change in the nineteenth century
can broadly be described as progress; the Whig version is inadequate because it
does not explain what we know of educational change in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries in a number of different countries. However, there are issues
raised in the 'Whig' version which would need to be addressed in any more
adequate historical account.
The classic Whig version of history links gradual political democratization
with liberal theories of freedom and is strongly Protestant in orientation. Accord
ing to this perspective, mass education was first stimulated by the Reformation,
with the recognition by Protestants of the 'proselytizing' potential of schooling,
and thereafter developed first and farthest in the Protestant countries of northern
Europe and the Puritan states of the north-eastern United States. The enormous
advances of the nineteenth century were the product of this early impulse, coupled
with the intellectual thrust of the Enlightenment, and of the gradual secular
movement towards political democracy, under the banner of liberal capitalism,
during the nineteenth century. Each element in this explanation would seem to
me deeply problematic, although I have no doubt that the questions that it poses
are important. Let me say a few words about each.
Religion and the churches clearly played the major part in the development
of schooling in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries and continued
to be a powerful force thereafter. However, the nineteenth-century national
education system was not just a linear development of church schooling but rather
a major departure from it; it was an institution sui generis, developed precisely
to break the clerical domination of schooling and to serve the broader interests of
state and civil society. To explain its origins we must therefore look beyond
religion and the churches as the determining forces.
The influence of Enlightenment philosophy clearly offers a more likely
candidate for the ideological basis of nineteenth-century mass education. With
out the philosophical empiricism of Locke and the rationalist optimism of the
French Philosophes, it is hard to imagine what educational ideologies would have
provided the ideological underpinning of the educational theories of the nine
teenth-century reformers. Locke's empiricism suggested the predominance of
nurture over nature and thus the potential for universal education; the eighteenth-
century theories of human rights provided a reason for educating everyone; and
the materialist psychology of Hartley and Condillac, with its associationist theory
of the memory, suggested that any mind could be developed through methodical
pedagogic techniques. No doubt the cultural humus of the Enlightenment and
the revolutionary era did provide an essential condition for the development of
emancipatory theories of education. However, as we know, nineteenth-century
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schools, particularly those for the popular classes, rarely reflected these ideals,
and only the most naively idealist of histories could present Enlightenment
ideology as the prime mover behind the development of national education
systems.
The third element of the 'Whig' triad is 'democracy' and the argument that
it was the gradual process of democratization which lay behind the development
of mass schooling. This, it seems to me, is the most vulnerable of the 'Whig
history' arguments since it is, for most of the countries in question at least, the
most anachronistic. National education systems were for the most part imposed
from above and, initially, owed little to popular agitation. They were first
pioneered in continental Europe during the age of absolutism, typically through
the efforts of 'enlightened despots' like Frederick the Great in Prussia and Maria
Theresa in Austria. They were typically consolidated after the French Revolution
in post-absolutist constitutional monarchies and republics which were essentially
pre-democratic, and the motive for their creation generally had more to do with
controlling and containing popular forces than with empowering and emancipat
ing them. There were, of course, radical traditions in Europe, from Jacobinism
to early socialism, which did link education with democracy and emancipation,
but it was not generally their notions which inspired those who actually imple
mented school reforms, and nor, it must be said, were their notions fully demo
cratic. As Davey and Miller have shown (1990), notions of rights, citizenship,
and social contract rarely included women as equals. Rousseau's plans for the
education of Sophie were very different from his plans for Emile, and even
Jacobins like Lepelletier, who wanted girls educated alongside boys, thought girls
needed less time in school (Green, 1990).
During the last decades of the nineteenth century, when a number of Euro
pean states had begun to enfranchise sections of the male working class, and when
that class had at last become a decisive force in formal politics, we can increas
ingly see educational reform as part of a process of democratization, and a major
object of popular struggle. In a few nations which had an extended franchise from
earlier in the century, as in the U.S.A., one can argue the connection for an earlier
period. However, in most instances where national education systems were
consolidated during the period from 1770 to 1840, this was not so much part of
a democratization process, as it was an effort by various ruling classes to contain
or forestall burgeoning democratic forces. Even in the U.S.A. and Canada, as
Kaestle and Curtis have shown, mass education was seen more often as a way of
erecting a bulwark against the potential anarchy of rising democracy than as a
way of empowering popular movements.
In his recent book, New Citizens for a New Society (1989), John Boh clearly
disagrees with this point of view, at least in relation to the development of state
schooling in mid-nineteenth-century Sweden. Noting, quite correctly, that this
development in Sweden predated significant urban and industrial development,
Boli sets out to show that mass schooling was part of the process of institution
alizing the modem state through the production of a new type of rational citizen.
'By the nineteenth century,' he writes, 'the corporate structure of estate society
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had been displaced by a new institutional framework in which the individual and
the polity were the only primordial social unit. In this framework every individual
was deemed a locus of sovereignty and therefore qualified to become an en
hanced, empowered participant in the collective enterprise of constructing a
progressive, just, righteous and humane society' (p. 250). Schooling was the only
force capable of producing these new citizens and the 1842 statute which
mandated folk schools in every parish and made education compulsory is thus
seen as a necessary expression of this historical imperative. The system created
was, according to Boli, characterized by: universality, equal opportunities,
standardization, and individualism. The creation of co-educational elementary
schools with standardized curricula is taken as evidence that the reforms were
motivated by democratic egalitarianism.
The main problem with this account, it seems to me, is that the process of
state formation occurring in early nineteenth-century Sweden is given a demo
cratic and egalitarian gloss that is utterly anachronistic. There were, certainly,
unique aspects of Swedish social development which tended to reduce the
visibility of class conflict. As Perry Anderson (1974) has illustrated, Swedish
absolutism had been unique in combining an independent, non-servile peasantry,
usually a feature of western absolutisms, with nugatory towns, as in eastern
absolutisms. What is more, it was distinctive in its inclusion of a separate peasant
estate within its four-curia system. Under the constitutionalist monarchy of the
first half of the nineteenth century, Swedish society continued to exhibit a
relatively static equilibrium with low-pressure class conflicts. However, the
ideology of that society is surely not described accurately by adjectives such as
individualist, democratic, and egalitarian. The Riksdag was still based on the
four-estate system of representation until 1866 when it was replaced by a
bi-cameral parliament with a twenty-one percent male franchise. In between the
state and the individual in this pre-democratic society there still stood the
corporate institutions like the church and the guilds, privileged by compulsory
membership until 1846. As far as the terms are historically useful, one may see
early nineteenth-century Sweden as in transition to a society based on individual
contract, but at this stage the concept of individual citizenship was based on
neither democratic nor egalitarian principles, and nor was education. The school
system, which, as Boli admits, was created in the teeth of peasant apathy, was
clearly differentiated, with a separate system of private schools for the middle
and upper classes forming a separate ladder from the folkskolar system. Partici
pation in this system was extremely unequal. Boli himself cites Johansson's data
for the Vasterbotten parish at the mid-century which show that school attendance
varied by a factor of twelve between children of civil servants (fifty-one percent)
and children of tenant farmers (four percent) (Boli, 1989, p. 234).
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2) Industrialization
If liberal theory has undergone a belated, and, I would argue, unsuccessful,
revival in the work of John Boli, the industrialization theory, on the contrary,
seems to have been allowed to rest in peace in recent years. It is now widely
accepted amongst educational historians (Archer, 1979; Melton, 1988; Boli,
1989; Green, 1990; Davey and Miller, 1990) that the development of national
education predates industrialization in many countries and that Britain was
exceptional in postponing the development of a national system until after the
first stage of industrialization had been accomplished. Furthermore, it now seems
fairly clear that whilst education and new skills became economic necessities in
the later stages of industrialization, during the first decades of the nineteenth
century, when several national education systems were established, the demand
for new industrial skills was fairly limited and not one of the main motivations
behind educational development. This is not to say that there was no occupational
rationale for schooling, but rather that the occupations targeted were not generally
industrial. Governments were concerned more with educating political leaders,
administrators, officers, soldiers, and loyal subjects rather than scientists, tech
nologists, production engineers, and skilled workers. By the 1830s, of course,
there were a growing number of more forward-looking politicians, industrialists,
and educational advocates in France, America, Prussia, and elsewhere, who saw
education, and particularly technical education, as a way of promoting industri
alization, but by that time national education systems were already well under
way. If we are looking at the origins of national education, rather than at its later
development, then industrialization is clearly not the significant factor.
3) Proletarianization and Urbanization
Neo-Marxists like Michael Katz have long argued a connection between the
development of mass education and the proletarianization and urbanization of
populations in the north-eastern states of the USA. Put simply, the argument is
that the rapid urbanization in the North-East between 1820 and 1860, fuelled by
large-scale immigration and internal migration, and coupled with the gradual
transition to wage labour in urban and rural areas, led to unprecedented class and
community conflicts and a crisis of youth socialization. Educational reform was
primarily a way of containing and controlling these forces through the imposition
of moral discipline by the WASP middle class. The thesis is immensely powerful
as an explanation of urban educational reform and offers a realistic assessment
of the motivations of reformers like Horace Mann who expressed their intentions
in ways that can be read in this fashion. The argument also can be effectively
applied to the situation in England in the conflict-ridden 1830s and 1840s where
educational reformers were equally prone to express their intention in terms of
moral and social policing (Green, 1990).
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However, the thesis is not easily generalizable outside these areas and this
period and therefore can supply no more than one part of a more general
comparative theory of educational development. The thesis fits well with the
situation in the urban north-eastern areas of the U.S.A. but has less purchase on
the rapid educational developments in some predominantly rural areas like the
mid-West. It is worth remembering that even by 1860, eighty-four percent of the
population in the U.S.A. lived in communities of fewer than 8,000 and the
majority still worked as independent farmers (Green, 1990, p. 64). By focusing
on developments in the urban north-east during the era of reforms (1830-60), Katz
not only underplays developments in rural areas but also rather foreshortens the
process of educational change in the U.S.A., thereby missing the important
contribution of the Early Republic to the construction of public education.
In relation to the origins of national education in continental Europe, the
urbanization/proletarianization thesis would seem to face even greater problems.
Here national education systems were first consolidated at a time when all the
countries concerned were predominantly rural and when the majority of the
working population had yet to be converted into wage labourers. By 1855, well
after the construction of their national systems, only twenty-seven percent of the
French population lived in towns, compared with thirty percent in Bavaria,
thirty-five percent in Saxony, twenty-eight percent in Prussia, and ten percent in
Sweden (Green, 1990, p. 55). The majority of the active population in all these
countries still worked in agriculture, mostly as independent farmers, and of those
who worked in industry, the majority were artisans rather than fully proletarian-
ized waged labourers.
However, an argument can be made for connecting the early stages of
proletarianization with the genesis of national schooling if we take this process
to include the development of 'proto-industrial' workers in the eighteenth cen
tury. James Melton, in his impressive work on the origins of state schooling in
Prussia, has argued that a number of factors in eighteenth-century Prussia,
including the growth of proto-industrial production, the decline of the guild
system, the proliferation of absentee landlords and landless rural poor, and the
de-feudalization of the peasantry, contributed towards a crisis of social authority,
particularly in relation to children, for which compulsory schooling was seen as
an effective antidote. Drawing on the work of Melton, Levine, and more recent
feminist historiography, Davey and Miller have effectively demonstrated how
these changes in production relations, and their associated family forms, can be
seen as constituting a breakdown of the patriarchal authority traditionally vested
in usually male heads of households. The development of national school
systems from the eighteenth century onward can thus be seen as a response to
this erosion of patriarchal power over children and an attempt to reconstitute
patriarchal authority through the state.
This seems to me to be a powerful argument and a crucial dimension of any
account of education and state formation during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and
nineteenth centuries. However, while it clearly contributes towards the analysis
of the origins of the pioneer continental education systems, it is not clear to me
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how this argument can be used to explain the uneven development of education
systems. England was centuries in advance of continental Europe in transforma
tions on which this account hinges—in the transition to a 'free' peasantry
(Macfarlane, 1979) and then to agricultural waged labour and in the spread of
proto-industrial household production—and thus presumably also experienced
the erosion of patriarchal authority earlier; yet this did not apparently generate a
commensurate movement towards national schooling. In their 1991 paper,
Davey and Miller seek to explain this by the somewhat contradictory argument
that there was less need for state schooling in Britain because the early spread of
wage labour under a precocious capitalism 'provided much of its own discipline'
(p. 15). In their later (1993) conference paper this argument is abandoned and
the explanation now rests on an argument about the particular nature of state
formation in Britain. Although it is not quite clear to me where this leaves the
argument about the crisis of patriarchal authority being the prime cause of mass
schooling, this focus now offers a theoretical approach to the problem of uneven
development to which I will return later.
Education and State Formation
All the accounts considered clearly contain important arguments which can
contribute towards an explanation of the rise of national education systems.
However, they remain partial explanations and lack the power to explain the
differential development of education systems in a range of different states. The
argument of education and state formation represents an attempt to sketch an
alternative theory which can account for these differences, particularly, it should
be said, with reference to the relatively late development of a national system in
England and Wales.
The key social factor, I would argue, in explaining the timing and form of
the development of education systems is the nature of the state and the process
of state formation. The major impetus for the creation of national education
systems lay in the need to provide the state with trained administrators, engineers,
and military personnel; to spread dominant national cultures and inculcate popu
lar ideologies of nationhood; and so to forge the political and cultural unity of
burgeoning nation-states and cement the ideological hegemony of their dominant
classes. This inevitably entailed at different times using education to perform
some of the functions suggested by existing theories. In societies undergoing the
proletarianization of labour, education could be a useful tool in acclimatizing
workers to waged employment whether in workshops, factories, or on the land.
Equally, in regions undergoing rapid urbanization, numerous social conflicts
were thrown up which it fell to schools to attempt to control and ameliorate. The
break-up of traditional pre-proletarian family forms caused particular problems
for youth socialization in the context of antagonistic class societies and education
was frequently seen as a substitute mechanism to achieve this in ways which were
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acceptable to the dominant classes. However, it was specifically the intervention
of the state which effected the formation of national education systems, and it is
therefore the nature of the state in different countries which must carry the largest
burden of explanation for the particular national forms and development of school
systems.
The national education system developed in parallel with the modern capi
talist state. The form of the national system was first prefigured in continental
Europe during the absolutist monarchies of the eighteenth century. These not
only developed many of the general features of the modern state—central
bureaucracies, standing armies, national taxation—but they also pioneered the
first moves toward public education with the provision of state funds for school
ing, and the drafting of prescribed curricula and legislation on school attendance.
Education was seen as an important means for furthering the mercantilist aims of
the state. It was essential for providing the trained cadres for the government
bureaucracy and the military and had an important role to play in generating the
skills needed for the fledgling state manufacturing projects. Not least, also, it was
recognized to be a powerful instrument for promoting political loyalty amongst
the people and for creating a cohesive national culture after the image of the ruling
class.
The nineteenth-century education system came to assume a primary respon
sibility for the moral, cultural, and political development of the nation. It became
the secular church. It was variously called upon to assimilate immigrant cultures,
to promote established religious doctrines, to spread the standard form of the
appointed national language, to forge a national identity and a national culture,
to generalize new habits of routine and rational calculation, to encourage patriotic
values, to inculcate moral disciplines, and, above all, to indoctrinate in the
political and economic creeds of the dominant classes. It helped construct the
very subjectivities of citizenship, justifying the ways of the state to the people
and the duties of the people to the state. It sought to create each person as a
universal subject but it did so differentially according to class and gender. It
formed the responsible citizen, the diligent worker, the willing taxpayer, the
reliable juror, the conscientious parent, the dutiful wife, the patriotic soldier, and
the dependable or deferential voter. If state formation involved using schooling
to create new citizens/subjects, it was also, as Davey and Miller's work suggests,
about creating clearly gendered social roles for these subjects and about fashion
ing new forms of patriarchal control over children. Typically, schools were
entrusted with making boys into useful citizens and girls into wives and mothers
who would rear the next generation of male citizens.
The formation of national systems occurred first and fastest in countries
where the process of state formation was most intensive. Three historical factors
have been particularly associated with this accelerated and compacted process of
state formation or 'nation-building.' One has been the existence of external
military threats, or territorial conflicts, which often have propelled the victim
nations into vehemently nationalistic responses and deliberate actions to
strengthen their state machines. Another has been the occurrence of major
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internal transformations resulting either from revolution, as in France, or from a
successful struggle for national independence, as in America. In each case the
country concerned has emerged from major conflagrations with an urgent task of
national reconstruction, not only to repair the ruins of war but also to establish a
new social order which will reflect the principles for which the struggle was
originally undertaken. Lastly, there have been the situations where nations have
been prompted into state-led programmes of reform to escape from relative
economic underdevelopment. Where one country is significantly behind other
countries economically it generally has not been possible to catch up simply by
the spontaneous initiatives of individual entrepreneurs. Liberal politics have not
been much use to underdeveloped countries, since they favour the already
powerful (Hobsbawm, 1990), and nations which have successfully reversed
histories of underdevelopment generally have done so either under the wing of
other more powerful states or through concerted, centrally directed programmes
of reform.
The development of national education systems has been historically closely
connected with these phenomena, not only during our period here but also in the
modem day where education has been a major priority of countries undergoing
national reconstruction after war or successful struggles for independence. In the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries those nations which underwent this kind of
state formation were most prone to develop national education and generally they
did this at the precise period when the process was at its highest pitch. Militaristic
state-building first propelled the eighteenth-century Prussian state into educa
tional development and the pressures of economic advance kept the process on
the boil in the next century, as absolutism gave way to constitutional bourgeois
rule. Absolutism played a similar if lesser role in France. But here it was
principally revolution and bourgeois social and economic reconstruction under
Napoleon, and after, that fuelled a similar educational drive. In the United States,
another leading country for educational reform, it was the need to consolidate a
new American state after the break with England that did most to galvanize
educational reform. Unlike in continental countries this was achieved less
through the work of the central state and more through the initiative of individual
reformers and the local state and county administrations with which they were
closely allied. If the process here appears to have been based on broader
democratic foundations and owed less to the Statist spirit that characterized
continental development, it was still clearly understood as a means of developing
the national culture and securing the political system and no less a process of
organized state formation.
The development of a national education system in Japan after the Meiji
Restoration of 1888 can also be understood as part of a process of intensive state
formation. As Herbert Passin has written,
educational reform ranks as one of the key measures in the transforma
tion of Japan from a feudal to a modern nation state....Through the use
of uniform teaching materials and the diffusion of anational language...,
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the schools helped promote a common sense of nationhood and the
displacement of regional by national loyalties. (Passin, 1965, p. 62)
During the pre-Meiji Tokugawa period, Japan had a thriving educational culture
amongst the Samurai elite whose children were educated in the domaine schools
run by the feudal authorities, but less than fifty percent of the population as a
whole (by 1860) went to school and most of these in the privately run Terakoya
basic schools. Towards the end of the Shogunate, and after the arrival of
Commodore Perry in 1853, Japanese culture began to be more open to western
science, but the schools remained dominated by traditional Confucian values. It
was the Samurai reformers after the Meiji Restoration who sought to modernize
Japan and saw education as a means of mobilizing the entire population in this
process of state formation.
With the establishment of a Ministry of Education in 1871, anew education
system was developed which initially drew heavily on western influences,
incorporating French principles of centralized administration and American
modern curricula. A later conservative backlash against westernization then led
to calls for a return to traditional Japanese values in education, epitomized in the
nationalistic Imperial Rescript of 1879, which stressed the role of education in
promoting loyalty to the state and the Emperor. After 1885, Japan's celebrated
education minister, Mori Arinori, sought to reconcile modernity and tradition by
promoting a westernized secondary education for the 61ite whilst preserving
traditional values in popular education. Though later assassinated by nationalists,
Arinori expressed his mission for education in classic nation-building terms:
'Our country must move from its third class position to second class, and from
second class to first, and ultimately to the leading position amongst countries in
the world' (quoted in Passin, 1965, p. 68). In the different world climate of the
1930s, the nationalistic strain would lead to full-scale militarism and indoctrina
tion in Japanese schools; during the Meiji period the nation-building role of
education helped transform Japan from a feudal to a modern state.
Canada West
The construction of the 'educational state' in Canada West in the mid-nine
teenth century provides another illustration of education as state formation but in
rather a different sense from the other examples cited here, since the formative
period of educational development occurred during a period of as yet unresolved
struggle over colonial rule. As Bruce Curtis's book clearly demonstrates, educa
tional reform in the period 1830-70 was inextricably tied up with struggles over
the nature of the colonial state and different parties had different ideas about what
kind of state they wished to promote through their educational reforms. What
they had in common was a belief that education was essential for the creation of
a new type of political subject whose own internalization of discipline and moral
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responsibility was seen as a pre-condition for political order in an emerging
polity, which, whatever form it eventually took, would involve greater inde
pendence and more representative government. As elsewhere, the reforms were
essentially constructed from above, and reflected the class aims of the dominant
groups, but they cannot be construed as a crude process of imposition and
unmediated social control. What Curtis demonstrates so well in his book is the
process by which the reformers sought through education to 'anchor...the condi
tions of political governance in the selves of the governed' (p. 15). As described
by Curtis, this amounted to a classic exercise in the construction of a cultural
hegemony by dominant groups through education, whereby 'official knowledge
presented the patriarchal, linguistic, ethical, political, economic and religious
interests of the ruling class as the general interests of society' (Curtis, 1988, p.
371).
England
In England the development of education was no less a process of state
formation than it was in these other countries. However, due to the particular
nature of the state, and of its relationship to civil society, a national education
system did not occur until relatively late compared with the other countries
mentioned here. Although I do not much like the terminology, this can be seen
as a question of early 'strengths' and later 'weaknesses.' Throughout the six
teenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, the British state was characterized
by relative unity of its kingdom and the relative stability and durability of its
institutions and ruling groups. One of the first consolidated nation-states in
Europe (despite the protracted and bloody process of colonization in Ireland), the
British state benefited from the early centralization of state power under the
Tudors, and the advantages afforded by its geographical insularity and maritime
strength, from which grew its colonial power. The early termination of absolut
ism through Cromwell's revolution, added to its other advantages, made possible
the early development of capitalist relations in agriculture, commerce, and later,
industry. During the eighteenth century, the relative absence of military conflict,
combined with the economic advantages of natural resources and colonial trade,
allowed capitalist development to take advantage of the home markets provided
by a relatively fluid society undergoing a demographic explosion. Early indus
trialization could thus occur organically, from the bottom up, without excessive
intervention from the state.
State formation, or 'nation-building' to use Walter Bagehot's nineteenth-
century phrase, was thus a comparatively precocious affair in Britain, and though
bloody and violent at times, to be sure, occurred more gradually than in many
other countries considered here. It also occurred without the enlarged, 'forcing'
apparatus of the absolutist state which was so central to modernization in other
countries. With a history of long-standing and relatively stable institutions and
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ruling groups to draw on, national identity did not have to be invented as in other
countries where nation-building required the elaboration of various nationalist
ideologies which literally had to manufacture traditions. If nationalism in other
countries meant creating what Benedict Anderson calls 'imagined communities'
(Anderson, 1983), Britain had no need of it, since the nation was the past. Such
a state also had less need for national education during the eighteenth century,
since there was not the great demand for bureaucrats and military recruits which
existed in absolutist states and since the population scarcely had to be schooled
in 'nationhood.'
The absence of a national education system in eighteenth-century England
was thus certainly not the product of a weak state. In their conference paper,
Davey and Miller refer to my argument about the late development of English
national education as hinging on the '"notorious weakness" of the British state'
(Davey and Miller, 1993, p. 6) but they are in fact quoting their own earlier paper
(Davey and Miller, 1991, p. 8) and not myself since neither that formulation nor
the argument it implies were in Education and State Formation. What I have
argued, following Hobsbawm (1969), Gamble (1981), and Marquand (1988), is
that the early 'strengths' of the British state and economy later became fetters on
the development of a modern state and economy, but this argument applies to the
period after 1860.
During the period 1815-60 it would be quite inaccurate to talk of a 'weak
state' in Britain, for the creation of a laissez-faire system precisely required a
strong—albeit streamlined—state to remove all the old barriers and restrictions
to 'free enterprise.' The state properly described as 'liberal' or 'laissez-faire'
emerged after the end of the Napoleonic Wars (although its principles derived,
of course, from Adam Smith in the previous century), and then developed only
gradually through deliberate state action. The term is not generally applied, as
Davey and Miller appear to suggest (Davey and Miller, 1993, p. 7), to the period
of Burkean reaction which followed the French Revolution. The liberal state was
deliberately minimalist, or tried to be, but was not so much weak as limited in the
extent of its apparatus and functions. This became a problem, I would argue, after
1860 and has remained so since, in the sense that after the so-called second
Industrial Revolution, and in what later became known as the era of monopoly
capitalism, successful economies came to require more effective state interven
tion in all spheres of life to ensure conditions of existence. Corrigan and Sayer's
account of British state formation, which consciously plays down its uniquely
'laissez-faire' features, is unable to explain these later obstacles to modernization,
and it is to explain this later course of development that I have stressed the English
'peculiarities.' However, whilst I would maintain that 'laissez-faire' was a
defining characteristic of the British liberal state in the nineteenth century,
'weakness' was not. During the 'golden age' of Victorian capitalism, the British
state certainly did not appear as 'weak,' even though it may be said to have been
storing up problems for the next generations.
Education was, however, in a sense, 'weak' or 'underdeveloped' in that
provision was in various respects both less extensive and less appropriate than it
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might have been to needs of the time, and compared with other comparable
countries. Admittedly these 'needs' often were not generally recognized, except
by the long-sighted, until later (say in the 1860s) and one may thus be accused of
hindsight and anachronism in applying them to earlier periods like the 1840s and
1850s. However, there were clear social and political 'needs' for more education
even at that time, as many did in fact recognize, and arguably also long-term
economic needs, for even if the British economy developed rapidly in these years
without improved education, the absence of that education would have conse
quences for the economy of the next generation.
This underdevelopment of education, I have argued, was the result of the
failure to develop a national system until late in the day; this in turn was the result
of the specific nature of state formation in Britain, where laissez-faire liberalism
continued to provide powerful arguments against the use of the state in education.
Some Conclusions
State formation theory still seems to me to provide the most powerful
analytical basis for understanding the origins of national education systems and
their uneven historical development. I know of no other theory which has equal
explanatory power across a range of geographical contexts and in different
historical periods. However, it is, as Roy Lowe (1991) perceptively remarked in
a review of Education and State Formation, very much an outline or portmanteau
theory, which is to say a theory which brings together a range of other arguments.
Its strength, therefore, depends very much on the elaboration of the theoretical
elements within it and on the detailed way in which it is developed in different
national historical contexts. Such specific studies will also, no doubt, continue
to force modifications in the way we conceptualize the process of state formation,
as is proper with any theory.
My own interest lies in developing the theory in relation to later historical
periods, thus moving away from the origins of national systems and starting to
look at how they have been elaborated in later periods as part of different
processes of state formation. Currently, this involves looking at education and
state formation during the Age of Empire, particularly in relation to Britain,
France, Germany, and Japan. This, of course, raises a whole new set of problems
in state formation in relation to nationalism, militarism, and imperialism. State
formation in western Europe in the hundred years after the French Revolution
was essentially about the creation of sovereign, territorially bounded nation-
states. In its liberal and Mazzinian form this generally meant welding together
heterogeneous populations and territories in larger units which were economi
cally and politically viable, and which were cemented by ideologies which
stressed statehood and citizenship rather than language and ethnicity, although
these were sometimes called upon as was politically expedient. As we know from
Hobsbawm's work (1989), nationalism took on very different guises towards the
16 HSE/RHE & HER
end of the century, stressing language and ethnicity in new racist discourses, and
increasingly becoming the property of the political Right. At the end of the
nineteenth century, state formation became, in many areas, empire-building;
since the First World War it has often come to mean the disaggregating process
of balkanization encoded in the Wilsonian doctrine of 'self-determination.' As
state formation in these contexts takes on radically different forms, so the
relationships between education and state formation change. If state formation
is to continue to be a useful concept for explaining educational change, it is
important to test its applicability in these contexts as well.
State formation theory may also be applied to issues in the contemporary
history of education. There are those who argue that the historical significance
of the nation-state is dwindling in the face of economic globalization, the rise of
supra-national entities, and the accompanying tendencies towards regionaliza-
tion, and that analyses of education which focus on the nation-state are becoming
irrelevant. I would not entirely share this view. Although it is clearly important
to take account of the supra-national forces shaping education systems, educa
tional change is still determined largely by the policies adopted by national
governments and this would seem likely to be the case for some time to come.
What is more, whilst post-modernists and advocates of the free market see a
world-wide shift in education systems away from collectivist goals and towards
an individualized and privatized consumerism, there is plenty of evidence that
national governments continue to use education as a means for pursuing national
goals, like economic competitiveness and social cohesion, albeit influenced by
global forces and supra-national entities like the European Union. This is still
true in the most market-oriented societies like Britain and the U.S.A., where
increasingly centralized control over schooling allows governments to use edu
cation as a tool of national policy as never before. In a different way it is also the
case in the new states emerging in Eastern Europe, many of which already are
using their school systems very deliberately as vehicles for nation-building. In
my own recent comparative work on contemporary post-compulsory education
policy, I have tried to use a state formation perspective to explain divergent
national patterns (Green and Steedman, 1993), and I hope to take this further in
future research.
There is still great scope for using a state formation perspective to help us
understand the different historical patterns which have led to the diversity of
modem education systems.
Education and State Formation Revisited 17
Bibliography
Anderson, B. (1983). Imagined Communities. London: Verso.
Anderson, P. (1974). Lineages of the Absolutist State. London: Verso.
Archer, M. (1979). The Social Origins of Education Systems. London: Sage.
Bailyn, B. (1960). Education in the Formation of American Society. Williamsburg,
Virginia: Institute of Early American History and Culture.
Boli, J. (1989). New Citizens for a New Society: The Institutional Origins of Mass
Schooling in Sweden. Oxford: Pergamon Press.
Bowles, S. and Gintis, H. (1976). Schooling in Capitalist America. London: Routledge
and Keg an Paul.
Corrigan, P. and Sayer, D. (1985). The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural
Revolution. Oxford: Blackwell.
Curtis, B. (1988). Building the Educational State, Canada West, 1836-1871. London,
ON: The Althouse Press.
Davey, I. and Miller, P. (1990). 'Family Formation, Schooling and the Patriarchal State,'
in Family, School and State in Australian History, ed. M. Theobald and R.J.W.
Selleck. London: Allen and Unwin.
Davey, I. and Miller, P. (1991). 'Patriarchal transformations, schooling and state forma
tion,' paper for Social Science History Association Conference, New Orleans.
London: Verso.
Davey, I. and Miller, P. (1993). 'Governance of the self, family and the state from the
reformation to the age of democratic revolutions,' paper for the 1993 Conference of
the Australian, New Zealand, and Canadian History of Education Societies, Mel
bourne.
Gamble, A. (1981). Britain in Decline. London: Macmillan.
Green, A. (1990). Education and State Formation. London: Macmillan.
Green, A. and Steedman, H. (1993). Educational Provision, Educational Attainments and
the Needs of Industry. London: National Institute of Economic and Social Research.
Hobsbawm, E. (1969). Industry and Empire. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Hobsbawm, E. (1990). Nations and Nationalism Since 1780. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Katz, M. (1968). The Irony of Early School Reform. New York: Harvard University
Press.
Katz, M. (1976). 'The Origins of Public Education: A Reassessment,' History of
Education Quarterly 16,4: 381-407.
Lowe, R. (1991). Review of Education and State Formation, in History of Education 20,
4: 380-81.
Macfarlane, A. (1978). Origins of English Individualism. Oxford: Blackwell.
Marquand,D. (1988). The Unprincipled Society. London: Macmillan.
Melton, J. Van Horn. (1988). Absolutism and the Eighteenth-Century Origins of Com
pulsory Schooling in Prussia and Austria. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Miller, P. (1986). Long Division: State Schooling in South Australian Society. Adelaide:
Wakefield Press.
Passin, H. (1965). Society and Education in Japan. New York Teachers'College Press.
Tyack, D. and James, T. (1986). 'State Government and American Public Education:
Exploring the Primeval "Forest",' History of Education Quarterly 26, 1: 39-69.
